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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is a consolidated appeal from the district court’s orders granting the
defendants-appellants’ motions to dismiss the indictments in related criminal cases
without prejudice. The district court abused its discretion by not dismissing the
indictments with prejudice in light of the totality of the misconduct of the
prosecuting attorneys during the grand jury proceedings and the resultant prejudice
to the defendants. In addition, the district court erred by failing to make requested
findings of facts regarding the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and prejudice
caused thereby.
B. Procedural History and Statement of Facts
1. Introduction
Bruce Erlebach was charged by Indictment with one count of Felony Battery
Upon Certain Personnel and one count of Misdemeanor Assault or Battery Upon
Certain Personnel. R (44470) 34. The same grand jury indicted Tyrell Erlebach on
nine counts: Attempted Rape, Attempted Strangulation, Domestic Battery Involving
Traumatic Injury in the Presence of Children, Felony Injury to Child, two counts of
Intimidating a Witness, Aggravated Battery, and two counts of Battery upon
Certain Personnel. R (44468/44469) 43-45. The Erlebachs moved to dismiss the
Indictments due to several instances of prosecutorial misconduct, including that the
Prosecutors presented the cases to the Grand Jury even though twelve unbiased
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jurors were not present. The district court granted the Erlebachs’ motions to
dismiss the indictments because of the absence of twelve unbiased jurors, but
dismissed without prejudice. The court did not make findings regarding the other
instances of prosecutorial misconduct.
2. The grand jury evidence
Kimberly Butler testified at the Grand Jury that she lived in Fruitland with
Tyrell, their two-year-old son (“H.B.”), and Ms. Butler’s eight-year-old son and sixyear-old daughter. GJT, pg. 5, ln. 1-12. On January 19, 2016, Bruce dropped Tyrell
off at the house. GJT, pg. 7, ln. 13-24. Kimberly heard Tyrell stumbling down the
hall. He entered the bedroom. GJT, pg. 8, ln. 2-6. Kimberly was already in bed
with H.B., who sleeps with his parents. GJT, pg. 7, ln. 9-15. Tyrell undressed and
got into bed. Kimberly testified that Tyrell said for her to “get my ass over to the
side of the bed so he was going to show me what his little penis was going to do with
me.” GJT, pg. 9, ln. 1-7. This was a reference to earlier testimony that Kimberly
told one of Tyrell’s female co-workers that he “had a little whipper.” GJT, pg. 10, ln.
16 - pg. 11, ln. 7.
According to Kimberly, Tyrell got on top of her, poked her in the eyes with his
finger, banged her head against the wall, put his hands around her neck, and said,
“How funny do you think my . . . little penis is now[?]” GJT, pg. 11, ln. 18-22.
Tyrell was nude. She was wearing boxer shorts and a T-shirt. GJT, pg. 12, ln. 7-13.
Tyrell did not make “any motions with his body,” nor did “he effect any sort of
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sexual contact between his genitals and [hers].” GJT, pg. 13, ln. 6-9; pg. 16, ln. 911. Kimberly testified that Tyrell said he was going to engage her in anal
intercourse, but never attempted to do so GJT, pg. 40, ln. 18-21.
Tyrell got off of Kimberly, who got out of bed and took H.B. into the living
room. Tyrell followed. GJT, pg. 16, ln. 22 - pg. 17, ln. 6. While she sat on the
couch, Tyrell stood in front of her. According to Kimberly, he pulled her underwear
to the side. She continued:
Q. So then the boxers and the undergarments were pushed aside and then what
happened at that time?
A. And then he told me again that he was going to show me what he was going to
do to me with his little whipper, his little penis, and then -- and then he told me
--then he stopped and told me if I didn't get my ass back to the bedroom that he was
going to bury me.
Q. When he said that, what he was intending to do after he had pulled your shorts
and underwear aside, did he do anything physically at that point?
A. No. No.
....
Q. When he -- when he -- when you were on the couch and he pushed your
underwear and your boxers to the side, did he have any contact with your vaginal
area?
A. No.
Q. So he just kind of grabbed your underwear and boxers and pushed them to the
side but he didn’t touch in any way, shape or form your genitals?
A. No.
GJT, pg. 21, ln. 4 - pg. 22, ln. 14. She explained that she “just moved [her] legs up”
to avoid his touch. GJT, pg. 40, ln. 15-17.
3

Officer Benjamin Key testified that Kimberly “said that Tyrell had attempted
to force himself on her but hadn't actually succeeded in doing so.” GJT pg. 82, In.
13-15. But, as explained below, that testimony was false. In fact, Kimberly told
Officer Key twice that Tyrell had not tried to rape her. That exculpatory evidence,
however, was withheld from the Grand Jury.
Kimberly testified that she went into the bedroom, grabbed her cell phone,
and called her mother. She also grabbed her pistol. Tyrell then grabbed his pistol.
GJT, pg. 22, ln. 17- pg. 23, ln. 6. She went into the older childrens’ bedroom and
kept Tyrell from coming in. After a while, she and the oldest boy jumped out the
window and ran to a neighbor’s house. GJT, pg. 25, ln. 21 - pg. 27, ln. 19.
Larry Butler, Kimberly’s father, and his wife, Debbie, went to the house in
response to Kimberly’s telephone call. GJT, pg. 45, ln. 3-25. Larry testified that
Debbie tried to force her way into the house and was pushed away by Tyrell. GJT,
pg. 49, ln. 21-25. Tyrell kicked at Larry and fell down. Thinking that Larry had
pushed him down, Tyrell said “Why did you do that, Larry?” Tyrell then grabbed
Larry and they started to wrestle. Debbie ran into the house and locked the door
behind her. Tyrell demanded that she let him in the house, but she refused to do so.
GJT, pg. 50, ln. 16 - pg. 51, ln. 9.
According to Larry, Tyrell then punched him, Larry punched back, and then
Larry’s jaw was broken by a second punch from Tyrell. GJT, pg. 53, ln. 1-11; pg. 55,
ln. 12-14.
Kimberly and the neighbor, Chuck Howard, a Payette City Reserve Officer,
4

returned to the house. On the way, she called Bruce and told him to come and pick
up Tyrell. When they arrived, Kimberly’s mom, Debbie Butler, was inside the
house. Her father, Larry Butler, was in the front yard, bleeding from his nose and
mouth. Tyrell was also outside, standing on the front porch in his undershorts.
GJT, pg. 29, ln. 21 - pg. 30, ln. 1.
Fruitland Officers Key and Hinkey arrived. GJT, pg. 62, ln. 8-20. Officer
Key saw Tyrell and Larry Butler out front. After speaking to Chuck Howard,
Officer Key approached Tyrell. GJT, pg. 63, ln. 16-24. He was still standing on the
porch and appeared intoxicated. Kimberly testified that Tyrell told her “a few times
that I needed to shut up – shut the fuck up and basically not to say anything to law
enforcement.” GJT, pg. 31, ln. 14-16. After speaking with Kimberly, Officer Key
decided to take Tyrell into custody. GJT, pg. 66, ln. 10-15.
The officer then testified that as he approached to handcuff Tyrell:
A. He began swinging both fists at me. He kicked the officer that was right in front
of me, Officer Yates, and then he kicked me as well which when he kicked Officer
Yates, he kind of stumbled off the porch and when he kicked me, I didn’t really
stumble but it did push me back slightly.
Q. Outside of the kicks, did any other part of him land on you? You said he punched
–
A. He swung but I don't think he connected. I don't remember him actually striking
me with his fist.
Q. How many times did he swing at you?
A. I remember both hands. One hand going one way and the other going the other
but–
Q. And so when you were effecting arrest, you were not alone?
5

A. No.
Q. Who was in the proximity of you trying to assist you in the arrest?
A. At the time of the arrest, I was standing in front of the door or in front of the
step. Officer Randall Yates from Payette Police Department was to my right and
Officer Lindsey Hinkey was -- I believe she was behind me. I'm not exactly sure
where she was.
Q. And so after he had swung and kicked and landed his kicks both on you and
Officer Yates, what happened?
A. Officer Yates deployed his taser.
GJT, pg. 68, ln. 23 - pg. 69, ln. 12.
The Grand Jury was not shown any of the three body camera videos, none of
which support the above testimony about the punching and kicking. The videos
show that Tyrell was not told why he was being arrested and initially resisted being
cuffed, pushing away Officer Key’s hands and asking what he had done to deserve
being arrested, but they do not show that he kicked either Officer Key or Officer
Yates. Tyrell told Officers Key and Henke that Larry Butler immediately punched
him in the face, Debbie Butler and Larry Butler had both forced their way into his
home and then Debbie Butler had locked the door behind him. This left Tyrell
standing on his front porch in his underwear and nothing else. Officer Yates did not
warn Tyrell prior to using the Taser and, in fact, only waited three seconds after the
incident started before tasing him. The videos also show that when Officer Yates
asked Officer Key if he needed to take any pictures of injuries on Officer Key,
Officer Key responded he did not think he was hit by Tyrell and if he was it was
only a tap on his protective vest. Defense Motion Exhibits A and B (pincites
6

follow).
In testimony, Officer Key explained that a Taser causes “neuromuscular
incapacitation,” making the victim’s muscles to spasm “very quickly” and causing
loss of muscle control. “It just drops you.” GJT, pg. 70, ln. 13-24. He testified that
Tyrell “fell to the steps,” but was still resisting arrest when Bruce said, “Why did
you do that, asshole?” What the video shows is that Tyrell was face-down in the
snow still under the effect of the Taser when Officer Yates deployed the Taser a
second time. Officer Yates testified he “followed up with what we call a drive stun
which is a secondary application of the taser. It's a pain compliance technique to his
lower left back.”

GJT, pg. 91, ln. 4-7. Tyrell screamed in agony from the pain,

crying out, “What did you do that for?” Defense Motion Exhibits A and B. At this
point, Bruce came to the aid of his son and engaged Officer Yates. GJT, pg. 91, ln.
8-16. Defense Motion Exhibits A and B.
After Tyrell was handcuffed, Officer Key deployed his Taser on Bruce. GJT,
pg. 74, ln. 19-24. Once Bruce was arrested, he apologized to the police. Officer
Yates testified that “[a]s soon as he'd been placed into custody, he was-- he said he
was sorry. Apologized. Made statements basically saying he knew he shouldn't
have done that. He was sorry.” Officer Yates also said Bruce acknowledged that he
had committed a crime. GJT, pg. 75, ln. 5-14. Officer Yates’ only injury was a “sore
jaw.” GJT, pg. 94, ln. 12-14.
Similarly, Officer Yates’ and Chuck Howards’ claim that Tyrell was kicking
and was swinging is not supported by the video evidence. Compare GJT, pg. 89, ln.
7

11-19, pg. 109, ln. 11-15 with Defense Motion Exhibits A and B. The arrest videos
were in the possession of the prosecuting attorney, but were not presented to the
Grand Jury.
3. The motions to dismiss the indictments
On May 9, 2016, Tyrell filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. Sealed
Record (“SR”) (44468/44469) 170. Tyrell argued that (1) the Grand Jury was not
composed of twelve (12) impartial jurors; (2) absent the false, misleading, and
inadmissible evidence and statements of law presented to the Grand Jury, a
reasonable person could not conclude there was probable cause to believe that he
committed the alleged counts; and (3) defects and misconduct in the proceedings
have prejudiced him and violated his right to due process of law. SR (44468/44469)
1.
Bruce also filed a Motion to Dismiss Indictment. Sealed Record (“SR”)
(44470) 17. He also argued that the state allowed the Grand Jury to issue an
indictment despite knowing that there were not twelve impartial jurors present. In
addition, he argued that the Grand Jury was misinstructed as to the essential
elements of Count I of the Indictment, i.e., the battery upon certain personnel
charge. Id, 11-16.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the Erlebachs presented evidence
that the prosecuting attorney 1) intentionally left three biased jurors on the Grand
Jury, which resulted in a qualified panel of only nine jurors; 2) presented false
evidence to the Grand Jury; 3) failed to present known and available exculpatory
8

evidence to the Grand Jury; and 4) presented inadmissible evidence. The Erlebachs’
evidence is discussed in detail at pages 17-37 below.
4. Order
The district court dismissed the Indictments. It found that the Indictments
were not found by twelve qualified jurors because Juror 1 was not qualified to serve.
In dismissing, the court wrote:
The State seems to value convenience over the constitutional rights of
the Defendant. Rather than proceed with the case after the State
discovered they did not have enough impartial grand jurors to
establish a quorum, they could have dismissed the grand jury and
proceeded to empanel a different grand jury on another day, or they
could have proceeded to preliminary hearing. The State had other
options than to present the case to that particular grand jury on that
particular day. In the interest of protecting Tyrell’s constitutional
rights, the Court hereby grants Tyrell’s Motion to Dismiss the
Indictment.
R (44468/44469) 318. It dismissed Bruce’s indictment for the same reasons. R
(44470) 126. The court did not reach the other bases for dismissal. R (44468/44469)
319-20; R (44470) 127.
5. Motion to clarify order and for findings of fact
Both Bruce and Tyrell filed Motions to Clarify That Order of Dismissal is
With Prejudice. R (44468/44469) 321; R (44470) 129. The Erlebachs argued that
the court should dismiss with prejudice or make findings on the record regarding its
decision to dismiss without prejudice so that appellate review of that decision would
be possible. R (44468/44469) 324-5; R (44470) 131. The court thereafter issued
Orders of Dismissal Without Prejudice. The Orders stated that:
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Pursuant to Rule 48 of the Idaho Criminal Rules, and based
upon the Order entered on August 5, 2016 in the above-entitled case,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled action is
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
R (44468/44469) 329; R (44470) 136.
The Court did not hold a hearing on the motions. It also did not make any
factual findings about the prosecutorial misconduct which the Erlebachs argued
mandated a dismissal with prejudice. R (44468/44469) 330; R (44470) 136.
Timely Notices of Appeal followed. R (44468/44469) 339; R (44470) 140.
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A. (1) Does the district court have supervisory power to dismiss an
indictment with prejudice for governmental misconduct? (2) Did the district court
abuse its discretion in denying the request for dismissal with prejudice?
B. Did the district court err in failing to make requested findings of fact
regarding the motions to dismiss with prejudice, particularly regarding the evidence
showing prosecutorial misconduct and resultant prejudice?
C. Did the district court err in dismissing the indictment without prejudice
as the evidence of prosecutorial misconduct at the Grand Jury and the resultant
prejudice to the Erlebachs require a dismissal with prejudice?
IV. ARGUMENT
A. The Court Has Supervisory Powers to Dismiss an Indictment with
Prejudice for Prosecutorial Misconduct and the District Court Abused its
Discretion in Denying the Request to Do So.
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1. The court has the supervisory authority to dismiss with prejudice.
A prosecutor before a Grand Jury:
operates without the check of a judge or a trained legal adversary, and
virtually immune from public scrutiny. The prosecutor’s abuse of his
special relationship to the grand jury poses an enormous risk to
defendants as well. For while in theory a trial provides the defendant
with a full opportunity to contest and disprove the charges against him,
in practice, the handing up of an indictment will often have a
devastating personal and professional impact that a later dismissal or
acquittal can never undo. Where the potential for abuse is so great, and
the consequences of a mistaken indictment so serious, the ethical
responsibilities of the prosecutor, and the obligation of the judiciary to
protect against even the appearance of unfairness, are correspondingly
heightened.
United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3rd Cir. 1979) (emphasis added). “[A]
court may dismiss an indictment if it perceives constitutional error that interferes
with the grand jury’s independence and the integrity of the grand jury proceeding.”
United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1992).
In United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1979), the Circuit Court
exercised its supervisory power based upon the district court’s findings that the
prosecutor subjected the grand jurors to various questions, statements, insinuations
and evidence that “served no other purpose than calculated prejudice.” 607 F.2d at
883-84. Noting that “[t]he prosecutor has a duty of good faith to the court, the grand
jury, and the defendant,” the Court found that “the manner in which the
prosecution obtained the indictment represented a serious threat to the integrity of
the judicial process.” Id. at 885. Because the objective in exercising supervisory
powers “[is] to protect the integrity of the judicial process,” the Court found “the
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cumulative effect of the ... errors and indiscretions, none of which alone might have
been enough to tip the scales operated to the defendants’ prejudice by producing a
biased grand jury.” Id. at 881, 884.
In Idaho, the existence of judicial supervisory power over prosecuting
attorneys derives from the state constitution. First, Article V § 18 of the Idaho
Constitution deems prosecuting attorneys to be members of the judicial branch.
The Supreme Court stated, in an opinion issued just 37 years after the adoption of
the state constitution, that:
It is plain that the intention of the framers of the Constitution, and of
the people in adopting it, was to do away with the office of district
attorney for each county, and that, by placing the creation, election,
qualifications, tenure of office, and duties of the office of district
attorney in that part of the Constitution devoted to the judicial
department, they charged him with the performance of duties and the
exercise of powers properly belonging to the judicial department. While
not making of him a judicial officer in the sense of being a judge, yet he
was, if not a quasi judicial officer, or an officer of the court, at least an
officer of the judicial department, charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging thereto.
State v. Wharfield, 41 Idaho 14, 236 P. 862, 862–63 (1925) (emphasis added). (The
Wharfield Court held that the defendant, who was accused of attempting to bribe a
prosecuting attorney, could not be found guilty of a statute prohibiting the bribing
of an executive officer.) Next, Article V § 2, states that the judicial power of the
state rests in the “Supreme Court, district courts, and such other courts inferior to
the Supreme Court[.]” The district court, vested with judicial power, perforce has
the power to supervise officers of the judicial department, subject to the greater
authority of the Supreme Court.
12

That was the holding of Crooks v. Maynard, 112 Idaho 312, 316, 732 P.2d
281, 285 (1987), where the Supreme Court found that the clerk of the district court
was subject to the supervisory authority of the administrative judge of the judicial
district, even though she was an elected official. It follows from Crooks that the
elected prosecuting attorney and her deputies in this case are also subject to judicial
supervisory authority. In addition, the Crooks Court found this supervisory
authority extended to “district judges and magistrates [who] have been given
day-to-day management authority over their courts.” Id. Among inherent powers of
judicial branch is authority “to protect and maintain dignity and integrity of
courtroom and to achieve orderly and expeditious disposition of cases” and to
“sanction those who appear before it.” Talbot v. Ames Const., 127 Idaho 648, 652,
904 P.2d 560, 564 (1995).
While there is no Idaho case directly addressing the question, the federal
courts have held that this supervisory power includes the power to dismiss an
indictment with prejudice. Dismissal with prejudice may be an appropriate remedy
where prejudice to the defendant results and the prosecutorial misconduct is
flagrant. United States v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073, 1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008). The appellate court
reviews the district court’s decision whether to dismiss the indictment with
prejudice under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Struckman, 611
F.3d 560, 577 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the district court abused its discretion when it
refused to dismiss with prejudice.
13

2. The court abused its discretion.
On review of a discretionary decision on appeal, “this Court must consider
whether the district court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its
decision by an exercise of reason.” State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, 491, 337 P.3d 647,
650 (2014), quoting Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139
Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475, 479 (2004).
a. The court did not correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion.
The court did not correctly perceive the issue as discretionary. This is shown
by the court’s citation to I.C.R. 48. R (44468/44469) 329; R (44470) 136. Dismissals
under that rule may be made for: (1) “unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to
the grand jury or if an information is untimely filed;” 2) “unnecessary delay in
bringing the defendant to trial,” or 3) “any other reason, [when] the court concludes
that such dismissal will serve the ends of justice and the effective administration of
the court's business.” I.C.R. 48(a). Subsection (c) of the rule states that, “An order
for dismissal of a criminal action is a bar to any other prosecution for the same
offense if it is a misdemeanor, but it is not a bar if the offense is a felony.” Thus, the
court in applying Rule 48 must have believed it did not have the discretion to
dismiss the Indictments with prejudice. This is incorrect as noted above.
Idaho Criminal Rule 6.7, the specific rule on motions to dismiss indictments,
does not limit dismissals to only those without prejudice. (“A motion to dismiss the
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indictment may be granted by the district court upon any of the following grounds . .
. .”) The failure of the trial court to properly identify and apply the law to the facts
found is an abuse of discretion. S. Idaho Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Astorquia, 113 Idaho
526, 528, 746 P.2d 985, 987 (1987).
b. The court did not act consistently with the legal standards applicable
to the specific choices available to it.
While the court selected one of the two remedies authorized by applicable
law, it did not act consistently with the legal standards applicable to it because it
did not make any effort to determine the scope of the prosecutorial misconduct in
the grand jury proceedings or the prejudice to the Erlebachs which resulted from
that misconduct. It simply mechanically applied the incorrect rule, erroneously
assuming dismissing without prejudice was the only available remedy.
c. The court did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason.
Because it did not believe it had discretion to dismiss with prejudice, the
court did not engage in any reasoning beyond applying the incorrect rule and thus
did not reach “its decision by an exercise of reason.”
In sum, this is one of those rare cases where the court abused its discretion
and the denial of the request to dismiss with prejudice should be vacated and the
matter remanded for further proceedings.
B. The District Court Erred in Failing to Make Findings of Facts
Regarding Prosecutorial Misconduct and Resultant Prejudice.
Idaho Criminal Rule 12(f) states, “[w]here factual issues are involved in
determining a motion, the court shall state its essential findings on the record.” The
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word “shall” indicates a mandatory duty. State v. Olivas, 158 Idaho 375, 383, 347
P.3d 1189, 1197 (2015), citing State v. Peregrina, 151 Idaho 538, 540, 261 P.3d 815,
817 (2011); State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721, 723, 852 P.2d 87, 89 (1993). Such findings
on the record allow the appellate court to properly review the trial court’s rulings.
Here, the Erlebachs made allegations of pervasive and prejudicial
misconduct, argued such misconduct justified dismissal with prejudice, and
expressly requested the court make findings of fact. Thus, it follows perforce that
the court erred in not making findings of fact. Compare, State v. Kirkwood, 111
Idaho 623, 627, 726 P.2d 735, 739 (1986), which held “that I.C.R. 12(d), does not
require the trial court to render explicit findings of fact as to the voluntariness of
the defendant's confession, where none are requested by either of the parties[.]”1
The court’s order that the dismissal is without prejudice should be vacated and the
case should be remanded for findings and reconsideration in light of those findings.
C. The Record Shows That the District Court Erred in Dismissing
the Indictment Without Prejudice.
This Court need not go any further in order to vacate and remand for further
proceedings in the district court. Such a result would be consistent with this Court’s
long-standing position that “trial courts find facts and apply law to the facts found”

1

When Kirkwood was decided, I.C.R. 12(d) read: “When factual issues are
involved in the determination of a motion, the court, upon the request of any party,
shall make its findings thereon.” 111 Idaho at 627, 726 P.2d at 739 (rule quoted in
dissenting opinion). Here, there was a request for findings. In addition, the Rule
has since been amended to eliminate the requirement of a request for findings.
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while “[a]ppellate courts determine the correctness of the law applied[.]” Avondale
On Hayden, Inc. v. Hall, 104 Idaho 321, 324, 658 P.2d 992, 995 (Ct. App. 1983).
However, if this Court decides to address the merits of the claim, the evidence
shows that the Prosecutor engaged in substantial misconduct which resulted in
prejudice to the Erlebachs. As will be shown below, the misconduct by the
Prosecutor and the resultant return of the Indictments had devastating personal
and professional effects on Bruce and Tyrell. Consequently, dismissal with
prejudice should be ordered.
1. Prosecutorial misconduct by allowing biased grand jurors to sit and by
allowing a grand jury of less than twelve unbiased jurors to return the
indictment.
Idaho Code § 19-1003(7) demands at least twelve impartial jurors to comprise
a Grand Jury. Idaho Code § 19-2019(2) defines actual bias as “the existence of a
state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to either of the
parties, which, in the exercise of a sound discretion on the part of the trier, leads to
the inference that he will not act with entire impartiality.” Idaho Code § 19-1001
and I.C.R. 6.7 provide that an indictment may be dismissed solely on the basis that
the Grand Jury itself was improper and violated of state law. Under I.C. § 19-1001,
“[t]he people, or a person held to answer a charge for a public offense, may challenge
the panel of a grand jury, or an individual juror.” Under I.C. § 19-1003, “[a]
challenge to an individual grand juror may be interposed” on the basis that “a state
of mind exists on his [the juror’s] part in reference to the case, or to either party,
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which satisfies the court that he cannot act impartially and without prejudice to the
substantial rights of the party challenging.” I.C. § 19-1003(7). Further, I.C.R.
6.7(b) specifies that a motion to dismiss an indictment may be granted based upon a
“valid challenge to an individual juror who served upon the grand jury which found
the indictment.” In addition, Idaho courts have long held that if a defendant’s
“substantial rights” have been prejudiced by an improperly convened grand jury, an
indictment should be set aside or dismissed. State v. Roberts, 33 Idaho 30, 188 P.
895, 897 (Idaho 1920).
In this case, the Prosecutors left three jurors on the panel who were not
impartial and then secured an indictment from a jury with only nine unbiased
members. This was intentional prosecutorial misconduct which should be
sanctioned.
(a) Pertinent facts
The Grand Jury was convened on January 29, 2016. However, the
Prosecutor quickly determined that numerous grand jurors knew the potential
defendants or knew the complaining witnesses in the case. Grand jurors that had
relationships with the Defendants were quickly removed from the panel and the
Prosecutor attempted to rehabilitate Grand Juror No. 1–a juror who had close
connections with a complaining witness against Tyrell. GJT, Vol.2, pg. 4, ln. 14-25,
pg. 5, 1-22. While the witness at issue was specifically a complaining witness in a
single count alleged against Tyrell, the Grand Juror’s responses indicate that she
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was not able to be entirely impartial about any aspect of the instant cases. In
particular, in response to the Prosecutor’s questions, Grand Juror No. 1 stated:
Okay. I work for the Oregon Department of Corrections and we’re
having–I’ve heard a lot of rumors at work and we’re having a benefit for
[Larry Butler] donating money because he was beat up.
GJT, Vol. 2, pg. 11, ln. 4-7. When pressed by the Prosecutor and asked if
relationship with Mr. Butler would negatively affect her ability to evaluate the facts
presented at the Grand Jury Proceedings, Grand Juror No. 1 stated that it would, “I
think negative. We’re both officers and I’ve worked close with him so I think it
would...” GJT, Vol. 2, pg. 11, ln. 4-15.
After querying other prospective grand jurors, the Prosecutor determined
that, without Grand Juror No. 1, a Grand Jury could not be impaneled. Thus, the
Prosecutor returned to Grand Juror No. 1 for further questioning – even after
Grand Juror No. 1 had stated that a personal relationship would negatively affect
her ability to evaluate the facts and evidence presented at the Grand Jury
Proceedings. Concerned that the insufficient number of impartial grand jurors
would require the Prosecutor to reconvene a grand jury at a later date, the
Prosecutor attempted to persuade Grand Juror No. 1 that she could be fair and
impartial to the Erlebachs.
The following exchanges then took place:
PROSECUTOR 2: So let me double-check. You are involved in a fundraiser
for the Butler family?
GRAND JUROR NO. 1: Well, we’re raising money to help him out when he’s
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off work.
GJT, Vol. 2, pg. 21, ln. 25 - pg. 22, ln. 3.
The Prosecutor then inquired as to Grand Juror No. 1s previous knowledge
about the case:
PROSECUTOR 2: What do you know about this case?
GRAND JUROR NO. 1: Just what I’ve heard at work that somebody was
beating up Larry’s daughter and he went over to protect his daughter and
then he got beat up and–
PROSECUTOR 2: If the facts come out that’s not true, can you put aside
those rumors?
GRAND JUROR NO. 1: I might be–you know, because the facts here have to
be true so...
GJT, Vol. 2, pg. 24, ls. 22 - pg. 25, ln. 4.
The Prosecuting Attorney continued, asking:
PROSECUTOR 2: Are you telling me that you could listen to what was said
here today and put out of your mind any rumors you may have heard?
GRAND JUROR NO. 1: Yeah, I can try to do that.
PROSECUTOR 2: Not try. Can you do that?
GRAND JUROR NO. 1: Oh, I think I can.
GJT, p. 25, ln. 25, p. 26, ln. 1-5 (emphasis added). The Prosecutor then asked
if the Grand Juror would feel pressure from the complaining witness if the Grand
Jury did not return an indictment:
PROSECUTOR 2: If you saw him at work and maybe you did indict on
everything or you didn’t indict on anything, are you okay with that?
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GRAND JUROR NO. 1: Yeah. I wouldn’t want it to step between the, you
know–you know, like him being, “Oh, well, I don’t want to talk to her
anymore.” I wouldn’t like that but–
PROSECUTOR 2: You could handle it.
GRAND JUROR NO. 1: I could probably handle it, yeah, because I’m retiring.
PROSECUTOR 2: You can do what you think is right here today?
GRAND JUROR NO. 1: I guess I think I could.
PROSECUTOR 2: You could follow the law?
GRAND JUROR NO. 1: Yeah.
PROSECUTOR 2: If you find that there’s no probable cause, you won’t indict?
GRAND JUROR NO. 1: I would hope not, yes.
PROSECUTOR 2: Let’s say the evidence content goes he didn’t do anything.
That’s all you heard. Tyrell didn’t do anything. The defendant didn’t do
anything. That’s all you hear. Are you going to indict him?
GRAND JUROR NO. 1: I’d probably have to hear a little bit more than that.
PROSECUTOR 2: Would you want to be indicted if there weren’t facts to
support it?
GRAND JUROR NO. 1: No, I would not.
PROSECUTOR 2: So you understand that you wouldn’t want to indict
someone unless there’s facts to support it?
GRAND JUROR NO. 1: Yes. I understand that.
PROSECUTOR 2: You’re willing to do that?
GRAND JUROR NO. 1: Yeah, I think so.
PROSECUTOR 2: Okay.
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GRAND JUROR NO. 1: Yeah.
PROSECUTOR 2: Do you have any other questions?
GRAND JUROR NO. 1: Can I talk to you now about my trip to Fiji?
GJT, Vol. 2, pg. 26, ln. 12 - pg. 27, ln. 23 (emphasis added).
Despite the fact that Grand Juror No. 1 had already stated that she worked
with Larry Butler, had been actively involved in a fundraiser for him, knew
considerable hearsay and alleged facts about the present incident, and believed that
it would be difficult for her to be fair and impartial, the Prosecutor determined that
Grand Juror No. 1 was impartial and impaneled her on the Grand Jury in the
instant case. Grand Juror No. 1 signed the concurrences for all counts in this case.
The Prosecutor also attempted to pressure other grand jurors to commit to
being impartial by informing the Grand Jury that the proceedings could not take
place unless a biased grand juror changed his or her opinion about their ability to be
impartial. When explaining why she was continuing to press Grand Juror No. 1, the
Prosecutor stated “[t]he reason why is that we have 15 [jurors in the pool] and we
have four people here [biased jurors]. If those four individuals are excused, we’ll not
proceed with the grand jury.” GJT, Vol. 2, pg. 15, ln. 18-20.
In addition, the record raises concerns about Grand Juror No. 19. That juror
indicated that he or she was professionally connected to law enforcement officers
serving as witnesses in this case. The Grand Jury transcript reads:
PROSECUTOR 1: Juror number again.
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GRAND JUROR NO. 19: No. 19.
PROSECUTOR 1: No. 19, your employment or occupation is–
GRAND JUROR NO. 19: They’ve just been on the scene. Not a problem.
PROSECUTOR 1: Okay. So you have a professional relationship with the
officers?
GRAND JUROR NO. 19: (Inaudible).
PROSECUTOR 1: All right. And then we have a Randall–Randall Yates and
he’s an officer as well with Payette City. You don’t know Mr. Yates? Okay.
All right.
GJT, Vol. 2, pg, 14, ln. 4-15. Although one is forced to speculate because the Grand
Jury transcript does not include a Grand Juror Number in the conversation below,
it appears that Grand Juror No. 19 had also previously indicated that he or she
knew law enforcement through employment:
PROSECUTOR 1: Okay. The other one is Charles or Chuck Howard. Okay.
Benjamin Ben Key. These are officers. Yes. So on Ben Key.
GRAND JUROR: Just because I (inaudible).
PROSECUTOR 1: Oh, that’s right. With the City.
GRAND JUROR: No. (Inaudible).
PROSECUTOR 1: (Inaudible), okay.
GJT, Vol. 2, pg. 13, lns. 12-18.
Based upon these statements, it appears likely that Grand Juror No. 19 is
employed in some capacity with either the Payette City Police or the Fruitland City
Police. It is also clear that Grand Juror No. 19 personally knew Officer Randall
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Yates, a complaining witness in both cases.
While the record regarding Grand Juror No. 19 is scant, the minimal
knowledge gleaned from the transcript raises legitimate concerns about Grand
Juror No. 19's impartiality. After being informed that Grand Juror No. 19 had
some relationship with numerous law enforcement officers involved in this case, the
Prosecutor failed to ascertain if such relationship would prevent Grand Juror No. 19
from rendering a fair and impartial decision. Because of this lapse, Grand Juror
No. 19's impartiality certainly should be questioned. Tyrell asked the district court
for the grand juror names and concurrence to assist in pre-trial motions related to
this issue. The district court denied the list of grand juror names. R (44468/44469).
In addition, Grand Juror No. 11 indicated that he had a close friendship or
relationship with Chuck Howard, the Payette Reserve Officer and friend of
Kimberly, who was a key witness for the State in its cases against both Tyrell and
Bruce. The Prosecutor specifically asked Grand Juror No. 11 if his relationship
with Mr. Howard would adversely affect his ability to be impartial:
GRAND JUROR NO. 11: Juror No. 11. I just know Chuck Howard as a
personal friend of ours.
PROSECUTOR 1: Personal friend. Now your friendship with Mr. Howard
and/or his family, would that impact or affect your ability to review all the
evidence and not just his?
GRAND JUROR NO. 11: No, it shouldn’t.
G.J. p. 13, lns. 22-25, p. 14, lns. 1-3. While Grand Juror No. 11 indicated that his
relationship with Mr. Howard “shouldn’t” interfere with his or her ability to be
24

impartial, the Prosecutor failed to follow up and assure that Grand Juror No. 11
had the requisite entire impartiality required. Grand Juror No. 11's response that
his relationship with Mr. Howard “shouldn’t” impact his decision making as a
Grand Juror falls short of the requirement that a juror must be able to unequivocal
assure that he or she will be impartial. The Prosecutor, apparently satisfied by the
Grand Juror’s equivocal response, failed to address the question of impartiality in
light of the relationship any further. As a result, the impartiality of Grand Juror
No. 11 like Grand Juror No. 19 cannot be assured.
(b) Argument
The Prosecutor’s intentional impaneling of a biased Grand Jury deprived the
Erlebachs of their constitutional and statutory rights to an impartial Grand Jury.
While the Grand Jury was composed of 12 jurors, three of the jurors were biased or
potentially biased. Pursuant to State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603, 610, 150 P.3d 296,
303 (Ct. App. 2006), a juror who admits bias must provide assurance that he or she
can act with “entire impartiality.” But here, three Grand Jurors admitted bias or
potential bias. Further, the Prosecutor failed to clearly elicit the necessary
assurances from these three jurors who ultimately heard evidence, deliberated, and
voted to indict.
The transcript of the Grand Jury proceedings demonstrates that the
Prosecutor knowingly impaneled biased or potentially biased jurors because the
State would be unable to proceed with the Grand Jury proceedings with less than
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the requisite 12 jurors. As the Prosecutor stated, “[t]he reason why [I am
conitnuing to press Juror No 1 for a commitment of impartiality] is that we have 15
[jurors in the pool] and we have four people here [biased jurors]. If those four
individuals are excused, we'll not proceed with the grand jury.” GJT, pg. 15, ln.
18-20.
The Prosecutor’s actions were egregious prosecutorial misconduct warranting
dismissal of the Indictment with prejudice. It is important to note that impaneling
even one biased or potentially biased juror, could lead to that bias tainting the other
jurors. See State v. Schenkolewski, 301 N.J.Super. 115 (N.J.Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997) (affirming trial court's dismissal of the indictment because two grand jurors
were potentially biased and finding that "it did not matter that one juror had been
excused and the other disqualified from voting, because the potential for tainting
the other jurors was self-evident."). Not only was one-quarter of the Grand Jury
biased or potentially biased, these jurors could have easily tainted the remaining
impartial jurors during deliberations.
Even if this Court were to find that the Prosecutor did not intentionally
impanel biased or potentially biased grand jurors, such conduct constituted reckless
disregard for the Erlebachs’ constitutional and statutory rights. This was also
egregious misconduct. See United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d at 1085 (ruling
“flagrant misbehavior” may include “reckless disregard for the prosecution’s
constitutional obligations.”). As the Ninth Circuit ruled in Samango, this Court
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should rule here that the manner in which the Prosecutor obtained the Indictment
was a serious threat to the integrity of the judicial process. Therefore, it would be a
proper exercise of the Court’s supervisory power to dismiss the Indictments with
prejudice.
It is not unreasonable to conclude that the Prosecutor was in a rush to
present the case to the Grand Jury to avoid public disclosure of police misconduct
and to obtain indictments on multiple charges which would not pass muster at a
preliminary hearing. This would oppress Tyrell and Bruce with multiple criminal
charges and prevent them from filing civil rights lawsuits alleging excessive use of
force during the arrests. See Henke Video (State Exhibit 1) at 8:51 (where Tyrell
threatens to file a lawsuit against the officers). However, “[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the government from punishing a
person for doing what the law plainly allows him to do.” State v. Rodriquez-Perez,
129 Idaho 29, 32, 921 P.2d 206, 209 (Ct. App. 1996), citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 363, (1978) and North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969).
Irrespective of the specific nature of the Prosecutor’s motive, the state denied
the Erlebachs the assurance of a fair and impartial Grand Jury. The Prosecutor
either knowingly impaneled a biased or potentially biased Grand Jury or recklessly
disregarding the Erlebachs’ constitutional rights. This Court should sanction this
egregious misconduct by dismissing the Indictments with prejudice.
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2. Prosecutorial misconduct by presenting false evidence and withholding
exculpatory evidence.
(a) Pertinent facts
The Prosecutor failed to present known exculpatory evidence as to the
attempted rape charge against Tyrell. This violated I.C.R. 6.2(a), which states that
the Prosecutor “must disclose” “substantial evidence which directly negates the guilt
of the subject of the investigation[.]”
The primary evidence at the Grand Jury proceedings in support of the
attempted rape count was hearsay testimony of Kimberly related by Officer Key.
However, the video recordings of the police interviews of Kimberly, which were
known to the prosecution at the time of the grand jury proceedings, show that
Kimberly repeatedly stated that Tyrell had not attempted to rape her.
Kimberly told Officer Key in front of her mother and father that Tyrell “didn’t
do anything, anywhere,” meaning, in the context of the conversation that Tyrell did
not attempt to penetrate her. Key Video (State Exhibit 1), at 14:15 - 15:29. Officer
Key then interviewed Kimberly in private and she denied that Tyrell tried to rape
her. Key Video, at 21:00-21:15. And when Detective Laurensen interviewed
Kimberly later that morning, telling her of the charges against Tyrell, she
responded, “I don’t think attempted rape.” Laurenson Video (State Exhibit 2) at
22:04.
The Prosecutor did not present this exculpatory evidence to the Grand Jury
nor did the Prosecutor ask Kimberly if Tyrell had attempted to rape her. The
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Prosecutors deliberately withheld exculpatory evidence from the Grand Jury and
relied upon false and inadmissible testimony from Officer Key. During her
examination of Officer Key, the Prosecutor asked:
Q: Okay. Did you do any sort of forensic or sexual investigation or exam on Kim
Butler?
A: No.
Q: Was there a basis to believe you needed to do so?
A: No. She had said that Tyrell had attempted to force himself on her but hadn't
actually succeeded in doing so.
GJT, pg. 82, ln. 9-15 (emphasis added). This statement, which is the most
incriminating testimony elicited in the entire Grand Jury Proceeding as to the
Attempted Rape count, was false. Kimberly never said that to Officer Key. She told
him Tyrell hadn’t tried to rape her. Twice. And she told Detective Laurensen too.
This was the intentional presentation of false evidence to the Grand Jury by the
Prosecutor. Or, at the very least, the deliberate withholding of exculpatory evidence
from the Grand Jury.
In addition, the Prosecutor failed to show the body cam videos of the incident.
If she had done so, the Grand Jury would have seen exculpatory evidence regarding
the Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer counts. Officer’s Henke’s body cam
shows Tyrell standing calmly on his front porch with both arms crossed against his
chest. He tells the officers that Larry Butler hit him in the face so that Debbie
Butler could get into the house and lock him out. Henke video (State’s Exhibit 1) at
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5:14-5:55. At 6:30, Officer Key tells Tyrell to turn around and put his hands behind
his back. The officer does not tell Tyrell that he is under arrest. Nor does he tell
Tyrell why he is being handcuffed. It appears that Tyrell pushes Officer Key’s
hands away. At 6:34, Officer Yates attacks Tyrell, but falls away looking as if he
lost his balance. No kicking or punching is shown. At 6:36, Tyrell has his back to
the front door frame and his empty right hand is held up in a surrender position.
Officer Key’s back blocks the view of Tyrell’s left hand. At 6:37, Officer Key has
backed away and Tyrell has his hands down at his side. Tyrell is unarmed. His
fists are unclenched. He is not fighting or threatening either officer. Officer Yates
then points his Taser at Tyrell. Officer Key says “no, no, no, no,” but Officer Yates
tases Tyrell anyway. Tyrell cries out in pain and falls to the ground. Someone says,
“You dumbass.” At 6:44, Tyrell is still on the snow-covered ground and is tased a
second time. At the same time, he is being told to “put your hands behind your
back.” Tyrell is now screaming in agony, asking “what did I do? What did I do?” At
6:49, Bruce is heard asking “What the hell did you do that for, asshole?”
Officer Key’s video at 6:30 also shows him telling Tyrell to turn around,
without explaining that he was going to arrest Tyrell or why. At 6:31, it appears
that Tyrell is pushing Officer Key’s hands away and that he has pushed Officer
Yates away. At 6:34, Tyrell kicks at, but misses, Officer Key. At 6:34, Officer Yates
tases Tyrell. At 6:41, Tyrell is tased a second time. Bruce is heard at 6:45. And
Bruce is tased at 6:49, as he is backing away from Officer Key.
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Officer Yates’ video (Defense Exhibit B) at :41 shows Tyrell push Officer
Key’s hands away from him. At :42, Officer Yates attacks Tyrell and is repelled.
There is no video evidence that Tyrell was punching at or kicked either officer. At
:45, Officer Key tells Officer Yates to not tase Tyrell. Officer Yates does so anyway
and does so again at :53. Later in the video, Officer Yates describes the alleged
battery on Officer Key: “He punched at Ben, so I tased him.” Yates Video 9:47. He
later says, “He punches at Ben and I try to grab him and he tries to punch at me, so
I just pulled my Taser out and I tased him.” Id., at 10:40. Officer Yates never
claims on the video that he or Officer Key were kicked by Tyrell, as was claimed at
the Grand Jury. When Officer Yates asks Officer Keys if he was hit, Officer Keys
responds: “if I got hit it was in the vest. I don’t even know.” Key Video #2 7:34.
In sum, the video evidence from three different viewpoints shows that the
testimony of the officers relating to the Battery on Certain Personnel counts against
Tyrell are false. Tyrell never punched or kicked either officer. Even if the videos
did not disprove the officers’ testimony, they contain exculpatory evidence which the
Prosecutor should have presented to the Grand Jury. Further, they show that
Bruce only engaged Officer Yates after his son was unnecessarily tased for a second
time and then only acted to protect Tyrell from the officers’ use of unconstitutional
excessive force.
Additionally, the State relied upon false testimony from Chuck Howard in
support of the attempted strangulation count. Specifically, the Prosecutor asked Mr.
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Howard:
Q: Okay. Outside of injuries to her face, did you see any other injuries?
A: She had some marks on her neck. I was there when some pictures were taken so
I saw that.
Q: So you saw-what type-can you describe the marks you saw on her neck?
A: Well, hand marks from strangulation.
Q: Well, can you describe them for me, please?
A: It looked like fingerprints. I getQ: Not fingerprints. They were red?
A: Right. Her neck was really red and her eye.
Q: What was their shape?
A: In the form of a handprint. I mean it was pretty self-explanatory.
Q: So it was long andA: Right, yes, yeah.
Q: And what angle was it regards to her neck? Was it horizontal? Was it vertical?
Was it diagonal?
A: Horizontal. And that was before I heard what happened.
Q: And how many marks were on Kimberly?
A: I don't remember.
Q: You don't remember?
A: No. I mean her eye stood out the most.
GJT, p. 110, ln. 12-25, p. 111, ln. l-10.
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Mr. Howard’s testimony was untrue. Officer Key’s video shows that he
examined Kimberly’s neck and there were no handmarks or even bruising. Key
Video #2, at 15:10-15:15; see also GJT, p. 78, ln. 1-17 (Officer Key describing redness
on Kimberly’s neck). In addition, the photographs described by Mr. Howard do not
show the injuries he describes. R (44468/44469) (Documents Filed Under Seal) 74.
(b) Argument
“In light of the prosecutor’s public responsibilities, broad authority and
discretion, the prosecutor has a heightened duty of candor to the courts and in
fulfilling other professional obligations.” ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the
Prosecution Function, Standard 3-1.4 (“ABA Standard”). Idaho Criminal Rule 6.2
states that a prosecutor must present or disclose known exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury. Furthermore, “[i]t is unethical for a prosecutor knowingly to use
perjured testimony or false evidence before either a court or a grand jury. The
prosecutor also has a duty to take corrective action if he presents evidence in good
faith but learns of its falsity during the course of the proceeding.” Grand Jury Law
and Practice § 9:8 (2d ed.) Idaho Rule of Professional Responsibility 3.3(a)(3) states
that a lawyer shall not “offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer,
the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence
and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable
remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.” See also,
Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 649, 8 P.3d. 636, 643 (2000), citing Napue v. Illinois,
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360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (“A State may not knowingly use false evidence, including
false testimony, to obtain a conviction.”) “This standard applies not only to false
evidence solicited by the prosecution, but also to false evidence that the prosecution
allows to go uncorrected.” Id. A conviction obtained by the knowing use of false
testimony is fundamentally unfair. Id. (citations and quotations omitted). See also
Samango, 607 F.2d at 882 (ruling “deliberate introduction of perjured testimony is
perhaps the most flagrant example of misconduct”).
“In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material
facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed
decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.” I.R.P.C. 3.3(d). In particular, “[a]
prosecutor with personal knowledge of evidence that directly negates the guilt of a
subject of the investigation should present or otherwise disclose that evidence to the
grand jury.” ABA Standard, 3-4.6(e) (4th Ed.). The Idaho Criminal Rules also
provide that “when a prosecutor conducting a grand jury proceeding is personally
aware of substantial evidence which directly negates the guilt of the subject of the
investigation the prosecutor must present or otherwise disclose such evidence.”
I.C.R. 6.2(a).
In this case, the Prosecutor presented false evidence and repeatedly failed to
disclose exculpatory evidence. This was egregious misconduct. The effect of that
misconduct prejudiced the Erlebachs and the Indictments should have been
dismissed with prejudice.
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3. Prosecutorial misconduct by presenting hearsay evidence.
The Idaho Rules of Evidence “govern all actions, cases and proceedings in the
courts of the State of Idaho[.]” I.R.E. 101(b). While the rules are modified at
preliminary hearings under I.R.E. 101(d)(1), there is no such exception for Grand
Jury proceedings. “A prosecutor should present to a grand jury only evidence which
the prosecutor believes is appropriate and authorized by law for presentation to a
grand jury. The prosecutor should be familiar with the law of the jurisdiction
regarding grand juries[.]” ABA Standard, 3-4.6(c).
Here, the Prosecutor engaged in misconduct when she presented Officer Key’s
testimony that Kimberly “said that Tyrell had attempted to force himself on her but
hadn’t actually succeeded in doing so[.]” In addition to being false, it was also
inadmissible hearsay, as a out of court statement offered for the truth of the matter
asserted. I.R.E. 802.
4. The Erlebachs were prejudiced by the misconduct
The defendant must demonstrate prejudice before the court may exercise its
supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988). This requirement is satisfied because the conduct
by the state in this case resulted in substantial prejudice to the Erlebachs. As the
court in Samango stated, “deliberate introduction of perjured testimony is perhaps
the most flagrant example of misconduct ...” 607 F.2d at 882. The Prosecutor’s
conduct in this regard was extremely prejudicial to Tyrell, as he would not have
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been indicted for aggravated battery against Larry Butler if they had seen Tyrell
tell police that Larry had punched him in the face first and Debbie had pushed her
way into his house locking him outside. He would not have been indicted for the
attempted rape but for the presentation of false evidence and the failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence. Likewise, had the grand jurors seen the audio/video of the
illegal arrest and tasing of Tyrell, they would not have indicted him for either of the
Battery of Law Enforcement counts because the video does not show Tyrell kicking
either officer and shows Officer Key saying he did not know if Tyrell made contact
with him.
And, if the jury had seen Tyrell lying face-down in the snow, unable to control
his muscles and screaming with pain from the first taser blast and then crying out
in agony from the second blast, it would not have indicted Bruce for Battery on a
Law Enforcement Officer. While an individual may not use force to resist a
peaceable arrest by a police officer, it is well-established that “a person may resist
the use of unreasonable force” by the police. State v. Lusby, 146 Idaho 506, 509, 198
P.3d 735, 738 (Ct. App. 2008); citing State v. Wren, 115 Idaho 618, 627, 768 P.2d
1351, 1360 (Ct. App. 1989).
Throughout the country, courts have recognized a general rule that
reasonable force may be used to defend ones self against the use of excessive force
by the police. 44 A.L.R.3d 1078; see State v. Wilkerson, 114 Idaho 174, 178, 755 P.2d
471, 475 (Ct. App.), aff'd, 115 Idaho 357, 766 P.2d 1238 (1988) (Modern trend of
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cases permit forceful resistance to an arrest when excessive force is used by the
officer); See also, e.g., Schlosser v. State, 372 P.3d 272 (Alaska Ct. App. 2016)
(Defendant is entitled to use force to resist arrest, in self-defense, if defendant was
being subjected to unlawful force, and if defendant honestly and reasonably believed
that he was being subjected to unlawful force.) Robinson v. City of San Diego, 954
F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (Under California law, a person may use
reasonable force to defend life and limb against excessive force.); State v. Courville,
61 P.3d 749 (Mont. 2002). (One can use force to defend against the imminent use of
unlawful force.); State v Reinwand, 433 NW2d 27 (Wis. App. 1988) (If officer uses
excessive force in making arrest, person may counter with use of reasonable force to
protect himself.)
The Idaho Supreme Court stated in 1925 that “if the officer uses unnecessary
force, the relations between the parties become the same as those between private
individuals; and if the person sought to be arrested believes or has reason to believe
that he is in danger of being killed, or of receiving great bodily injury, he may
defend himself, repelling force with force, to the extent of slaying the officer when
necessary to save his own life, or save himself from serious bodily harm.” State v.
Wilson, 41 Idaho 616, 243 P. 359, 362 (1925). And if the arrestee may defend
against the use of unreasonable force, the same must be true for bystanders seeking
to aid the arrestee, as a battery is justifiable if the defendant was acting in the
defense of another. I.C. § 19-201 (“Lawful resistance to the commission of a public
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offense may be made: 1) By the party about to be injured. 2. By other parties.”); I.C.
§ 19-203 (“Any other person, in aid or defense of the person about to be injured, may
make resistance sufficient to prevent the offense.”); ICJI 1517 SELF DEFENSE.
The Prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence from the Grand Jury when she failed
to play the audio/video of the excessive force used by the police. See, State v.
Tavarozzi, 446 A.2d 1048 (RI 1982) (In prosecution against woman for disorderly
conduct and assault on police officer stemming from St. Patrick's Day celebration,
reversible error occurred when relevant evidence tending to prove that assault was
justified in resistance of excessive force was excluded.)
Finally, the cumulative effect of errors caused improper influence and
usurpation of the Grand Jury's role which warrants dismissal of the Indictment
with prejudice. Cumulative error exists when the “cumulative effect of the ... errors
and indiscretions, none of which alone might have been enough to tip the scales,
operate[] to the defendant['s] prejudice by producing a biased grand jury.”
Samango, 607 F.2d at 884; see State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 70 (2011) (noting
“[u]nder the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.”) (Internal
quotation and citation omitted).
In this case, even if the Court finds the individual grounds to dismiss the
Indictment with prejudice unpersuasive, the Court should follow the reasoning in
Samango, and hold the cumulative effect of the state’s misconduct caused improper
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influence and usurpation of the Grand Jury’s role. As in Samango, the manner in
which the state obtained the Indictment in this case represents a serious threat to
the integrity of the judicial process.
Tyrell Erlebach has suffered greatly from the state’s misconduct. He suffered
the loss of professional employment, as a cardiothoracic physician’s assistant,
damage to his reputation, and the loss of considerable personal property. He has
been deprived of the companionship of his son, as he was unable to see him for
months due to the No Contact Order issued by the court. R (44468/44469) 25, 31.
(At this time, he only sees his son twice a week.) He has been deprived of a
relationship with two additional children that he raised as his own for four and one
half years. Id. Moreover, he has been required to expend considerable sums in
order to post a $200,000 bond and for his legal defense, which are ongoing. R
(44468/44469) 22,
Bruce was indicted for a felony charge by a jury which never saw the evidence
that he only acted to protect his son from the excessive force used by the police
against Tyrell. He too has suffered damage to his reputation and has expended a
substantial amount of money for the $100,000 bond and legal fees.
While many of these hardships are the plight of other criminal defendants,
the cumulative errors during the course of this case warrants a finding of
substantial prejudice that must result in dismissal of the Indictments with
prejudice. In United States v. Aguilar, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1208–10 (C.D. Cal.
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2011), the court found prejudice where the defendants were “put through a severe
ordeal . . . as a result of a sloppy, incomplete and notably over-zealous investigation”
including false testimony. In dismissing with prejudice, the court noted that “the
financial costs of the investigation and trial were immense, but the emotional
drubbing these individuals absorbed undoubtedly was even worse.” Id. Likewise,
in this case, dismissal of the Indictment with prejudice is justified not only as a
sanction for and a deterrent to future prosecutorial misconduct, but also to release
the Erlebachs from further anguish, expense, and uncertainty.
V. CONCLUSION
If the Court decides to examine and weigh the evidence in this case, Tyrell
and Bruce respectfully ask this Court to reverse the district court and remand the
cases with directions to dismiss the indictments with prejudice. Otherwise, this
Court should remand the case to the district court for further proceedings under the
correct rule of law with appropriate findings of fact.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of February, 2017.

/s/ Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Bruce and Tyrell Erlebach
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